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Abstract
Predictive processing approaches to brain function are increasingly delivering promise for illuminating the computational under-
pinnings of a wide range of phenomenological states. It remains unclear, however, whether predictive processing is equipped to
accommodate a theory of consciousness itself. Furthermore, objectors have argued that without specification of the core computa-
tional mechanisms of consciousness, predictive processing is unable to inform the attribution of consciousness to other non-human
(biological and artificial) systems. In this paper, I argue that an account of consciousness in the predictive brain is within reach via
recent accounts of phenomenal self-modelling in the active inference framework. The central claim here is that phenomenal con-
sciousness is underpinned by ‘subjective valuation’—a deep inference about the precision or ‘predictability’ of the self-evidencing
(‘fitness-promoting’) outcomes of action. Based on this account, I argue that this approach can critically inform the distribution of expe-
rience in other systems, paying particular attention to the complex sensory attenuationmechanisms associated with deep self-models.
I then consider an objection to the account: several recent papers argue that theories of consciousness that invoke self-consciousness as
constitutive or necessary for consciousness are undermined by states (or traits) of ‘selflessness’; in particular the ‘totally selfless’ states
of ego-dissolution occasioned by psychedelic drugs. Drawing on existing work that accounts for psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution
in the active inference framework, I argue that these states do not threaten to undermine an active inference theory of consciousness.
Instead, these accounts corroborate the view that subjective valuation is the constitutive facet of experience, and they highlight the
potential of psychedelic research to inform consciousness science, computational psychiatry and computational phenomenology.
Keywords: active inference; predictive processing; consciousness; self; psychedelics
Introduction
Phenomenal consciousness—the ‘what-it-is-like’ (Nagel 1974) to
experience—has now been an area of serious scientific study for at
least 30 years (Seth 2018). More recently, the predictive processing
framework has generated considerable excitement for its poten-
tial contribution to consciousness science. This is largely due to its
capacity to go beyond merely positing the presence or absence of
consciousness in a given system and to contrastive analysis of the
computational mechanisms underlying various phenomenologi-
cal states. However, a theory of consciousness within predictive
processing remains elusive, largely due to the fact that predictive
processing is not exclusively concerned with conscious process-
ing (But see: Hohwy 2012; Dolega and Dewhurst 2015; Friston
2018; Solms and Friston 2018; Wiese 2018; Williford et al. 2018;
Clark 2019; Clark et al. 2019; Kirchhoff et al. 2019; Whyte 2019;
Friston et al. 2020; Hohwy and Seth 2020; Ramstead et al. 2020b;
Safron 2020; Solms 2019, 2021; Whyte and Smith 2020).
Doerig et al. (2021) emphasize that predictive processing, as it
stands, is insufficiently constrained to provide a theory of con-
sciousness due to being vulnerable to what they call the ‘other
systems argument’. A key desideratum for a theory of conscious-
ness on their view is that it ‘should be able to determine which
systems, apart from awake humans, are conscious’ (p. 7). They
contend that predictive processing fails to deliver on this due to
the fact that ‘there is no computational understanding of the cru-
cial characteristics’ (p. 21) that define the conscious condition
within predictive processing. In this paper I aim to show that
predictive processing, in particular in the recent formulations of
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the active inference framework, has the resources to deliver a
fully-fledged theory of consciousness via a theory of subjectivity
grounded in self-modelling.
Active inference is a process theory of the free energy prin-
ciple (Friston 2010; Friston et al. 2017a). Living systems, on this
approach, can be understood to embody statistical models of
their worlds, where they are biased towards the realization of
‘phenotype-congruent’ outcomes (Ramstead et al. 2020a). On this
view, agents are ‘self-evidencing’ in that they act in order to max-
imize the evidence for their own existence (Hohwy 2016). The
breadth of explanations within this approach—from microscale
explanations applied to understand the adaptive behaviour of
bacteria (Tschantz et al. 2020) and plants (Calvo and Friston 2017),
all theway up to social and cultural dynamics (Veissière et al. 2019)
and natural selection (Campbell 2016)—brings the need to identify
the particular processes associated with consciousness itself into
sharp relief.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In ‘The active infer-
ence framework’, I give an overview of the relevant mechanics of
the active inference framework. In ‘Consciousness in active infer-
ence’, I propose a self-modelling theory of subjectivity (Metzinger
2004) within active inference. On this view, consciousness can
be understood as arising from ‘subjective valuation’—the sys-
tem’s inference about precision on control of self-evidencing or
allostatic outcomes across multiple levels of the hierarchical gen-
erative model. I then consider how subjectivity is ‘shaped’ by
hierarchically deep self-models, by considering some examples
of disruptions in ordinary self-consciousness. In ‘Consciousness
in other systems’, I explore how this characterization can inform
attribution of consciousness to other systems, through identifi-
cation of complex sensory attenuation mechanisms associated
with the more elaborate forms of self-modelling understood to
underpin consciousness on this account. ‘The selflessness chal-
lenge’ considers an objection, the ‘selflessness challenge’—that
theories of consciousness that equate consciousness with self-
consciousness (‘subjectivity theories’) are challenged by selfless
experiences, most notably experiences of ‘ego-dissolution’ occa-
sioned by psychedelic drugs (Letheby 2020; Millière 2020). In
‘Psychedelics and selflessness in active inference’ I build on an
existing account of ego-dissolution in the active inference frame-
work (Deane 2020), with a particular focus on the affective and
hedonic tone of the experience. In ‘Responding to the selfless-
ness challenge’, I respond to the selflessness challenge; I argue
that understanding ego-dissolution in the active inference frame-
work accounts for how the system can still be conscious without
the typical structure of experience provided by deep self-models.
Instead, these accounts in fact corroborate the view put forward
in this paper—that subjective valuation is the constitutive facet
of experience. I argue that within active inference, consciousness
and subjectivity are best understood in terms of a model of allo-
static control. The upshot of this is to show that both the active
inference framework and psychedelic science have much to offer
on the scientific understanding of consciousness.
The active inference framework
This section introduces the relevant mechanics of the active infer-
ence framework as a formalization of allostasis, before explicating
how thesemechanics can be understood to underpin phenomenal
selfhood. Staying alive requires organisms to maintain homeosta-
sis, an ‘internal balance’ (Cannon 1929), by keeping physiologi-
cal states—‘essential variables’ (Ashby 2013)—within reasonable
bounds. The principles underpinning homeostasis have long been
cast within the language of control theory (Conant and Ross Ashby
1970), where homeostasis is achieved through autonomic control
loops, such as sweating to lower body temperature. Creatures like
human beings exhibit a form of prospective control or ‘predic-
tive regulation’ termed allostasis. In other words, they regulate
the internal milieu by anticipating physiological needs and act-
ing to meet them before they arise (Sterling 2012; Pezzulo et al.
2015; Stephan et al. 2016; Schulkin and Sterling 2019; Corcoran
et al. 2020).
The active inference framework formalizes allostasis in terms
of a single imperative—to minimize the divergence between
expected and observed outcomes under a generative model that
is fine-tuned over the course of phylogeny and ontogeny (Badcock
2012). On the free energy principle, the basic imperative is to
remain in ‘expected’ states—a ‘species-specific window of via-
bility’ (Clark 2013, 13). The free energy principle (Friston et al.
2010; Badcock et al. 2019) thus casts control theoretic ‘essen-
tial variables’ in terms of high precision prior expectations. This
means that organisms are phylogenetically endowed with an
expectation (and therefore bias to act) to e.g. maintain a body
temperature within reasonable bounds. These high precision
prior expectations are not amenable to perceptual revision and
instead must be fulfilled through corrective action (e.g. seek-
ing out a shaded tree to maintain viable body temperature).
Here, prior expectations are acquired through past experience,
over the course of both phylogeny and ontogeny (Badcock et al.
2019).
The notion of a hierarchical generative model lies at the cen-
tre of the active inference framework. A generative model is
specified in terms of probabilistic beliefs about how observations
relate to the states of the world that cause them (the likeli-
hood), beliefs about how the states evolve over time and prior
beliefs—beliefs about the state of the world prior to observation.
Inference here corresponds to inversion of the model in com-
puting the probability of the unknown or hidden causes of the
impinging sensory signals. It is intractable to compute this pos-
terior directly and so approximate Bayesian inference is made
tractable by optimization of a posterior although variational infer-
ence. In this way, the approximate posterior converges towards
the true (unknowable) posterior through theminimization of vari-
ational free energy (Friston et al. 2017a). Crucially, free energy
can also be interpreted as a bound on the evidence for a gener-
ative model. This means that minimizing the free energy just is
maximizing model evidence—hence the notion of self-evidencing
(Hohwy 2016; Palacios et al. 2020).
Active inference formalizes allostasis (and action) as an infer-
ence problem, ‘planning as inference’ (Kaplan and Friston 2018)
under the free energy principle (Friston 2019). The planning and
execution of action or a sequence of actions (a ‘policy’)—under this
scheme—becomes a problem of inference where the action with
the highest prior probability is that which minimizes ‘expected’
free energy—the expected dyshomeostatic consequences of an
action policy (Kaplan and Friston 2018). Selection of optimal
action policies involves having counterfactually rich expectations
of the states of affairs that would be brought about contingent
on actions (Seth 2014; Pezzulo 2017; Friston et al. 2017a). In other
words, to select action policies that maximize self-evidencing out-
comes over time, organisms rely on deep temporalmodels (Friston
et al. 2017a). Deep temporal models encode expectations about
the evolution of states of affairs over time contingent on action
policies, such that the system can infer actions that result in sen-
sory states conducive to continued existence—sometimes called
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Just as with perceptual inference (belief updating or ‘state
estimation’), action selection is understood in terms of Bayesian
model selection, where possible action policies are scored with
respect to the expected free energy associated with pursuing a
given policy. Here, the agent is equipped with beliefs about tran-
sitions between (inferred) states of the world, where beliefs about
state transitions are updated in light of the action or action pol-
icy that is currently being pursued. Conditioning state transitions
on actions—in the generative model—allows the agent to select
action policies that have the least expected free energy, where
expected free energy can be decomposed into ‘epistemic and prag-
matic’ value, such that the agent can learn about its environment
while realizing prior preferences (Friston et al. 2015; Friston et al.
2017). This process of selecting actions that minimize expected
free energy, which has been dubbed ‘allostatic control’ (Kiverstein
and Sims 2021), is not itself thought to underwrite phenomenal
selfhood (and experience). Rather, I will argue that phenomenal
selfhood is underwritten by hierarchically deep inference about
the precision on expected free energy. This ‘allostatic control
model’—understood as a ‘subjective valuation’ on the ‘fit’ of the
action model to the world spanning multiple timescales—will be
unpacked in sections to come. First, it is worth unpacking what
it is the system needs to control on this account—the minimiza-
tion of expected free energy—in terms of the realization of prior
preferences and maximization of epistemic value.
Pragmatic value and prior preferences
Agents are not disinterestedly inferring their control of sensation
via action. Rather, in active inference the agent acts to real-
ize prior preferences—changing the world to make it conform to
prior expectations, as opposed to changing beliefs to conform
to the world (i.e. perceptual inference). Active inference thus
recasts ‘essential variables’—physiological quantities that must
remainwithin specific bounds for an organism to stay alive (Ashby
2013)—as high precision ‘prior preferences’. Prior preferences are
phenotype-specific states that the organism expects itself to be
in—connecting control to states of the body and views of selfhood
based in interoceptive inference (Seth and Friston 2016; Barrett
2017; Seth and Tsakiris 2018). Prior preferences about essential
variables encode probability distributions over states (rather than
a single ideal setpoint), and the sufficient statistics that specify
this setpoint (mean and precision) are free to vary and can be tog-
gled according to the context (Ainley et al. 2016). This is key in
allostasis, as it allows for temporary deviations from a homeo-
static setpoint in order to realize sensory states in the ‘attracting
set’ on longer timescales. For instance, heart rate and blood pres-
sure are more flexible to contextual alteration in order to realize
certain actions (e.g. fleeing from a predator), while others such as
blood pH and core body temperature may be less variable due to
more constant high precision (Corcoran et al. 2020). While many
prior preferences are phylogenetically endowed, over the course
of ontogeny an organism will acquire prior preferences that sub-
tend increasingly deep temporal scales. The expected free energy
of a given policy, then, is going to depend to some degree on how
much the given policy fulfils prior preferences, and so, as we will
see, a critical part of the phenomenal self-model is understood
in terms of an inference about control of the realization of prior
preferences.
Epistemic value
Self-evidencing agents not only act in order to realize prior pref-
erences, but they also engage in novelty-seeking behaviours that
realize epistemic value (Friston et al. 2015, 2016). The epistemic
value or affordance of a given policy refers to the information
gain or resolution of uncertainty about the causes of sensation.
Optimal epistemic action, or ‘epistemic foraging’, requires the
agent to have beliefs about their own uncertainty, enabling action
directed towards higher sensory precision. Agents minimizing
expected free energy seek out observations that resolve ambigu-
ity about the state and causal structure of the world. Curiosity
and novelty-seeking behaviour are accounted for within this for-
mulation of epistemic action (Friston et al. 2015; Kiverstein et al.
2017; Mirza et al. 2018; Pezzulo and Nolfi 2019). This can be
understood in terms of sensitivity to long-term epistemic affor-
dances (Bruineberg and Rietveld 2014; Parr and Friston 2017).
When the agent is confident about its model of the world, and
epistemic value is much the same across policies, pragmatic or
instrumental value (fulfillment of prior preferences) dominates
behaviour.
Consciousness in active inference
In this section I argue for a self-modelling theory of subjectiv-
ity within the active inference framework. The central claim
is that consciousness is best understood as being underpinned
by hierarchically deep self-models understood in terms of ‘sub-
jective valuation’—precision estimation on the action model—
across multiple levels of the generative model. In other words,
consciousness arises in a system that evaluates the ‘fit’ of its
model with the world—how well outcomes align with expected
outcomes given the kind of creature it is—across multiple
timescales. This inference informs action and policy selection
across multiple timescales—from refining a motor action based
on proximal sensory outcomes to domain general inferences
about expected control across variable environments on longer
timescales. The upshot of this section is a view of subjec-
tivity as ‘subjective valuation’, understood as a kind of self-
modelling that is (in normal awareness) intimately bound up with
aspects of the phenomenal self, such as the sense of agency and
affectivity.
For clarity about how different contents of consciousness map
to the generative model, I sequentially unpack the inferential
architecture of the hierarchical generative model and how this
architecture relates to conscious contents in the following four
subsections: ‘Perception’ covers basic models of perception as
(hidden) state estimation approximating Bayesian inference; ‘Pre-
cision’ covers precision-weighting in perceptual inference; ‘Active
inference’ connects active inference and planning as inference as
a formalization of allostasis (Attias 2003; Botvinick and Toussaint
2012; Kaplan and Friston 2018; Millidge 2020) to particular aspects
of phenomenal selfhood, arguing that an inference about ‘agen-
tive control’—endogenous control of self-evidencing outcomes
via action—means that phenomenal selfhood is implicit in the
active inference framework. ‘Affectivity’ extends this picture to
argue that affective inference can similarly be understood as an
inference about allostatic control, manifesting computationally
as precision on the action model that guides domain general pol-
icy selection and is closely related to interoceptive and emotional
inference (Seth and Friston 2016; Fotopoulou and Tsakiris 2017;
Smith et al. 2019). In ‘Towards a theory of subjectivity’ I argue that
this hierarchically deep inference about endogenous control is not
merely contents of consciousness, but rather ‘shapes’ subjectiv-
ity, permeating perception of the world (and self). This functions
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A simple starting point to think about the generative model is to
consider it in the case of moment-to-moment perception, which
can be understood as state estimation or the brain’s ‘best guess’ of
the hidden causes of the incoming sensory signal. This basic (illus-
trative) generative model maps the relationships between obser-
vations (o)—the incoming sensory data and the hidden states (s)
in the world that caused the sensorium. A ‘likelihood mapping’—
encoding the probability of an observation under a generative
model, given its causes (the hidden states in the world)—captures
this relationship. In other words, what is the probability of the
observations ‘given’ the world is in a certain state? Formally, this
is denoted as a likelihood model P(o|s). The full generative model
includes beliefs about the most likely state of the world prior to
any observation, which is known in Bayesian inference as the
‘prior’, denoted by P(s).
Of course, what the system needs to infer is not the probability
of observations given the hidden states, but the inverse, the prob-
ability of hidden states given the observations. This is achieved
through variational Bayes—movement from what the system has
access to observations, prior beliefs and beliefs about how obser-
vations are caused by hidden states, to what it needs to infer: the
hidden states that are the most probable causes of the incom-
ing sensation—i.e. the posterior probability of the states ‘given’
the observations P(s|o). Inference about hidden states given the
observations is known as model inversion, as it is the inverse
mapping from the consequences or outcomes to causes. Model
inversion finds the most plausible cause of observations, and as
such, perception can be understood as ‘posterior state estima-
tion’, i.e. estimating the hidden states and other variables that
cause sensory outcomes. Formally, the process of updating a prior
belief into a posterior belief on the basis of new sensory evidence
is called Bayesian belief updating.
Precision
Predictive processing architectures benefit from radical con-
textual flexibility afforded by ‘precision-weighting’. Precision-
weighting can be understood in terms of amplification or gain
control, regulating the interaction between top-down and bottom-
up signals by weighting them according to their expected
‘precision’—where heavily weighted priors or prediction errors
exert greater influence in determining the resulting posterior
inference. Precision can be understood as a prediction of the
reliability of one’s own beliefs, —e.g. confidence in the likeli-
hood mapping. Attentional processes operate on second-order
statistics like precision: in other words, attentional states can
be understood in terms of beliefs about the (precision of the)
system’s beliefs. This means that precision—on the simple gen-
erative model just described—can be understood as the extent
to which the system thinks observations reliably map to hidden
states. Formally, precision is the inverse variance of a proba-
bility distribution (Feldman and Friston 2010), and optimization
of precision-weighting is frequently equated to attention within
predictive processing schemes (Feldman and Friston 2010; Clark
2013). Heuristically, precision can be thought of as predictabil-
ity or reliability of predictions—something that itself has to be
inferred.
Predictive processing offers a picture of how a confluence of
precision-weighted informational streams determines perceptual
inference. Perceptual inference involves integrating information
from across modalities to infer the hidden causes of sensation—
for instance, during binocular rivalry, auditory (Lunghi et al. 2014),
olfactory (Zhou et al. 2010) and tactile information (Lunghi and
Morrone 2013) have all been shown to influence which percept is
dominant. Interoceptive (Salomon et al. 2016) and proprioceptive
(Salomon et al. 2013) information have been shown to affect visual
experience using a continuous flash suppression paradigm.
Cue integration is one such example of how integration of
(precision-weighted) informational streams gives rise to the resul-
tant percept. In a cue combination task, observers are presented
with two more cues about a perceptual variable—such as, in
early cue integration, the use of two depth cues (e.g. stereo and
motion parallax) (Landy et al. 1995). The reliability of the cues
can be varied (for instance, by varying their visibility or contrast)
to make one cue more reliable than the other. A series of stud-
ies have shown that when observers are asked to indicate their
percept (a depth estimate), their estimates—depending on the
cues, weighted by their precision, in combination with a prior
probability—are approximately Bayes optimal (Landy et al. 1995;
Ernst and Banks 2002; Knill and Pouget 2004).
Another example is gist perception in object recognition—
where the ‘gist’ of the scene engages past experience to generate
the most likely prediction about the object’s identity (Bar 2003;
Oliva and Torralba 2006). For instance, in the case of an ambigu-
ous object, the context of a scene can determine whether the
ambiguous input is perceived as a hairdryer or a drill depending
onwhether the context is in a bathroom or aworkshop. These pre-
dictions are fed back to early visual areas to speed perception by
constraining the hypothesis space of possible interpretations.
‘Predictive penetration’—social, cognitive and emotional—
have all been demonstrated (O’Callaghan et al. 2016). Sensori-
motor contingencies—predictions about how the world changes
according to our actions—have also been shown to shape the con-
tents of consciousness (Skora et al. 2021). Importantly, precision is
thought to mediate engagement with affordances—latent possi-
bilities for action (Cisek 2011; Pezzulo and Cisek 2019) and sensory
attenuation—the top-down filtering out of afferent (incoming)
information, both from the body (interoception) and the senses
(exteroception). As we will see, striking the right balance of
precision in perceptual inference requires deep self-models.
The basic predictive processing story so far casts the brain as
a hierarchical prediction machine using belief updating schemes
to approximate Bayesian inference by utilizing ‘priors’ (probabil-
ity distributions about hidden states of the world) and incoming
sensory data (‘prediction errors’) to arrive at a posterior estimate:
a ‘best guess’ of the hidden causes of sensory signals (Clark 2013,
2015; Hohwy 2013; Aitchison and Lengyel 2017; Nave et al. 2020).
Prediction errors are a central concept in predictive processing
and the free energy principle. In a mathematically general sense,
the free energy gradients that drive Bayesian belief updating in
the free energy principle can always be expressed as a prediction
error (in the form of a difference in log probabilities). In specific
schemes, such as predictive coding, prediction errors are often
treated as explicit variables that may be encoded by the activ-
ity of specific neuronal populations in the brain (e.g. superficial
pyramidal cells).
Predictive processing delivers a compelling story about the con-
tents of perception, where ‘conscious perception is determined
by the prediction or hypothesis with the highest overall posterior
probability—which is overall best at minimizing prediction error’
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be ‘something-it-is-like’ to perceive—i.e. how subjectivity itself is
underwritten by the mechanism’s prediction error minimization.
In the next two sections, we see how these same principles can be
built up to give an account of a subject of experience in terms of
phenomenal self-models.
Active inference and the phenomenal self
‘The active inference framework’ gave an overview of active infer-
ence and allostatic control. This section and the next section
on affective inference will look at how this notion of how allo-
static control can be tied to phenomenal selfhood, in particular
how the system’s inference or evaluation of its own allostatic
control—used to inform ongoing policy selection across multiple
timescales—can be understood to underpin the phenomenology
of being an agent.
The phenomenal self-model can be understood as ‘the content
of the conscious self: your current bodily sensations, your present
emotional situation, plus all the contents of your phenomenally
experienced cognitive processing’ (Metzinger 2003, 299). Phenom-
enal selfhood is understood as being ‘The way you appear to
yourself, subjectively, consciously’ (Metzinger 2004, 26). Increas-
ingly, the formal principles of self-modelling implied by active
inference are thought to underpin phenomenal self-modelling
(Limanowski and Blankenburg 2013; Hohwy and Michael 2017;
Friston 2018; Limanowski and Friston 2018, 2020; Deane 2020;
Deane et al. 2020). On these views, ‘some notion of “self-hood” or
“self-agency”—in the sense of inference about control—is inherent
in active inference’ (Limanowski and Friston 2020, 2), as optimal
action planning rests on this notion of control—where the system
infers its control of sensation via action to realize self-evidencing
outcomes. As such, the self is seen as being a ‘hypothesis or
latent state (of being) that can be associated with a self-model’
(Limanowski and Friston 2020, 3). In what follows, the infer-
ence about precision on intentional selection—cast in terms of
an ‘allostatic control model’—is thought to underpin phenome-
nal selfhood. This inference about allostatic control is understood
to span from lower-level motor control all the way up to domain-
general (and abstract) expectations of allostatic control across
contexts.
Inference about the control of sensation via action—‘agentive
control’ (Deane et al. 2020)—has been linked to the phenomenol-
ogy of being an agent (Limanowski and Friston 2020). Agentive
control is best understood as the system’s inference of its own
ability to endogenously control sensory inputs via action (Hohwy
and Michael 2017) and as such is intimately related to the ‘sense
of agency’—the experience of oneself as an agent who can cause
events by acting (Haggard 2017). Agentive control is understood
here to be temporally deep, because expectations of the conse-
quences of actions are not confined to the immediate future, but
can predict abstract and distal outcomes (Pezzulo et al. 2015). For
example, an agent may expect proximal sensory consequences of
tipping a watering can to water a plant pot, but also have tempo-
rally deep—and ‘abstract’ (Gilead et al. 2019)—expectations about
the form of the plant over the timescale of weeks andmonths con-
tingent on actions. Recall that, under active inference, lower levels
of the predictive hierarchy track regularities that are unfolding on
shorter timescales and higher levels track regularities unfolding
on longer timescales (Kiebel et al. 2008; Friston et al. 2017b). In just
the same way that an organism can infer its own ability to control
the immediate sensory consequences of action, by tracking regu-
larities over time it can track its control of sensory outcomesmore
generally, where expectations of the downstream consequences
of action inform policy selection (Friston 2018).
A central idea here is that, in acting, the system must infer
‘itself’ as able to bring about the (self-evidencing) consequences
of the action, where the self-evidencing consequences are under-
stood in terms of expected free energy. Inference about agentive
control is intimately related to the allocation of precision and
most specifically the lowering of precision to attenuate sensory
evidence in certain contexts. There are two forms of sensory
attenuation—‘physiological’ and ‘perceptual’ sensory attenuation
(Palmer et al. 2016)—that critically relate to agentive control on
this account.
The first to consider is ‘physiological sensory attenuation’
(Palmer et al. 2016), which is critical for movement initiation in
active inference (Brown et al. 2013). Action initiation involves ‘sys-
tematicmisrepresentation’ (Wiese 2017)—whereby proprioceptive
evidence that, for instance, my arm is not moving, is attenuated
to allow the system to bring about the desired movement (Adams
et al. 2013; Brown et al. 2013). Higher-level prior beliefs attenu-
ate current sensory evidence and higher precision is afforded to
the anticipated sensory consequences of the desired action. Pre-
diction error is then suppressed by making the prediction come
true, through reflex arcs at the lowest level of the hierarchy (Parr
et al. 2018). In the setting of motor control, this perspective on
action is closely related to ideomotor theory (Limanowski 2017)
and 20th-century formulations in terms of the equilibrium point
hypothesis (Feldman and Levin 1995). In other words, all that is
required for intentional movement is a specification of the desired
sensorimotor endpoint of a movement—and motor reflexes bring
the position of the body into line with that equilibrium or setpoint.
Another perspective on this formulation is perceptual control
theory (Mansell 2011), where action is in the game of bringing
about desired sensory consequences—in this instance proprio-
ceptive sensations from the musculoskeletal system. In order
to move, then, the system predicts itself in the desired state,
and as able to control sensation via to bring about the desired
state. Physiological sensory attenuation thus aids in entertain-
ing counterfactual hypotheses about oneself (Limanowski and
Friston 2020) in order to generate the self-fulfilling prophecy of
moving.
This self-attenuation needs only be applied transiently for
movement initiation, but these same sensory attenuation mech-
anisms are thought to underpin various states of altered self-
experience. For instance, in the ‘rubber hand illusion’ (Botvinick
and Cohen 1998), visual information about the location of
the hand is deemed to be precise due to the corroborating
synchronous stroking pattern on the rubber hand, while the
conflicting proprioceptive input suggestive of the hand’s real loca-
tion is down-weighted in order to maintain a coherent bodily
representation (Limanowski and Friston 2020).
‘Perceptual sensory attenuation’ is the top-down filtering of
afferent information to limit how much feedback is received from
self-generated movement. On the current account, perceptual
sensory attenuation is critical to the formation of the ongoing
inference about agentive control. Originally developed as a the-
ory of motor control, the ‘comparator model’ posits that motor
commands are refined through comparing sensory consequences
of an action with the intended consequences of an action (Miall
and Wolpert 1996; Wolpert and Flanagan 2001). Subsequently,
the comparator model has been used to account for the sense
of agency (Feinberg 1978; Frith 2005; David et al. 2008), where
inference about endogenous control over the causes of sensory
signals is thought to underpin the sense that an action is agen-
tive or self-generated. For instance, sense of agency would be low






/nc/article/2021/2/niab024/6360857 by The U




input, such as (when wearing a VR headset) a virtual hand that
moved in a way that did not correspond to movements of the sub-
ject’s real hand. The mismatch between the expected and actual
consequences of a given action justifies the attribution of sen-
sory outcomes to exogenous (external) rather than endogenous
(internal) causes, such that attribution of sensory outcomes to
exogenous causes results in a reduced or absent sense of agency
(Sirigu et al. 1999). Indeed, incongruent action-outcomes have
been linked to a reduced sense of agency (O’Sullivan et al. 2018).
A self-other distinction critically relies on balancing this attribu-
tion to exogenous and endogenous causes.
Selectively attenuating precision on sensory inputs allows the
system to filter out irrelevant inputs (Crapse and Sommer 2008a),
such as those caused by self-generated actions. One such example
of this is saccadic suppression, where, despite saccadic eye move-
ments, perception of the environment remains stable. Reduced
precision on afferent inputs from self-produced tactile sensa-
tion is thought to cause inability to tickle oneself (Blakemore
et al. 2000). Sensory attenuation in relation to movement and
self-experience will be discussed in more detail in the sections on
disturbances of self-consciousness and other minds.
Affective inference
Affective inference, on the current account, is also under-
stood in terms of an inference about allostatic control. Affective
inference—in terms of a contextually flexible inference of the pre-
cision on prior preferences and epistemic affordances (opportuni-
ties for epistemic gain or uncertainty reduction)—acts to ‘tune’ the
organism to possibilities for self-evidencing action in the environ-
ment. Precision on prior preferences is inferred across the control
hierarchy (or ‘deep goal hierarchy’ Pezzulo and Cisek 2019). Pain
perception is a great example of ‘tuning’ to the current context.
Precision is allocated to, for instance, the ‘healthy body condi-
tion’ prior preference (Ongaro and Kaptchuk 2019) according to
a host of contextual factors. This flexibility enables organisms
to ‘tune their own pain perception according to both their prior
beliefs and the specific biological goals they believe are attain-
able in that context’ (Moutoussis et al. 2014, 70). In accordance
with this, mounting evidence speaks against the more classical
view of pain as tracking tissue damage, in favour of a view of pain
perception as underpinned by a process of inference. In partic-
ular, Bayesian models of pain perception provide evidence that
affectively charged percepts are inferential in nature (Morton et al.
2010; Anchisi and Zanon 2015). For example, studies show that
patients who receive treatment in a medical context experience
considerably higher pain relief than those who receive analgesic
drug treatment covertly (Benedetti et al. 2003, 2011). The felt inten-
sity of pain can be adjusted according to the context and the sur-
vival needs of the animal, modulated by attention, expectation,
conditioned pain modulation and placebo responses (Atlas and
Wager 2012; Atlas et al. 2014; Kirsch et al. 2014; Kong and Benedetti
2014). Even social information can have a profound influence on
experience: other people’s pain reports affected participants’ pain
experience and physiological indicators of increased pain such as
the skin conductance response (Koban and Wager 2016).
Inference about endogenous control of self-evidencing out-
comes can thus be understood as an inference about ‘subjective
fitness’—the expected precision of the organism’s phenotype-
congruent action model (Hesp et al. 2021). On this account, inte-
roceptively registered bodily changes track how well the organism
is doing at minimizing expected free energy—i.e. fulfilling prior
preferences and resolving uncertainty (Joffily and Coricelli 2013;
Seth and Friston 2016; Kiverstein et al. 2019, 2020). This contextu-
ally flexible evaluation of model fitness is essential for organisms
to persist and perform adaptive actions in volatile environ-
ments. Promoting self-evidencing outcomes on longer timescales
requires organisms to be sensitive not only to prediction error
reduction in the present, but the rate of prediction error reduc-
tion over time (Joffily and Coricelli 2013; Kiverstein et al. 2019; Van
de Cruys 2017). On this view, certain rates of prediction error over
time—such as progress towards a goal—become prior preferences
fulfilled by (temporally extended) action. As such, deviation from
the prior preference manifests to the system affectively, acting
as motivation to realize the prior preference via action. The roots
of these approaches can be traced to control theoretic precursors
that postulate a second feedback system that senses and regulates
the rate of the action guiding system (Carver and Scheier 1990).
Inference about the reliability of the action model allows the
system to increase or decrease precision on the current policy
(Kiverstein et al. 2019; Hesp et al. 2021). For instance, if the cur-
rent policy is reducing prediction error at a rate that is worse than
expected, this manifests to the system as negative affect and acts
as an incentive to discontinue the current course of action. Affec-
tive valence here is being reimagined within the active inference
framework as a ‘domain general controller’ (Deane et al. 2020;
Ramstead et al. 2020b). Inference about how well the system can
expect to reduce error via action ‘in general’ is informative as it
informs precision on policies across contexts, acting as a domain
general prior on the precision of policies generated by the action
model (Hesp et al. 2020, 2021).
Deane et al. (2020) suggest that a sensitivity to worse than
expected rates of prediction error reduction over time (Kiverstein
et al. 2017, 2020; Hesp et al. 2021), manifesting phenomenolog-
ically as negative affect, drives the system to switch to more
tractable goals. For instance, while loss of control in a particu-
lar context (such as learning to play a particularly difficult piece
in a piece of music) might create negative affect, this negative
affect functions as an incentive to switch to a task with a bet-
ter expected rate of prediction error reduction. As such, loss
of control in a particular domain does not necessarily impact
a more domain-general sense of control, related to more fun-
damental and pervasive sense of self as a causally efficacious
agent. As such, affective inference—inferring precision on prior
preferences and epistemic affordances across multiple hierarchi-
cal levels—tunes the organism to adaptive actions in the given
context.
Towards a theory of subjectivity
In his paper ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ Thomas Nagel argues:
An organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is
something it is like to ‘be’ that organism—something it is like
‘for’ the organism. (Nagel 1974, 436)
The preceding sections saw how the sense of being a ‘self’ is
inherent in active inference. It may be argued however that while
the active inference framework may shed light on the computa-
tional correlates of the contents of consciousness, it cannot shed
light onwhy there is a subject of experience in the first place—why
there is ‘something it is like’ to be an agent.
Why then, in the active inference framework, is experience
‘felt’? The claim here is that phenomenal consciousness is under-
pinned by estimation of the precision of its own action model.
To be more specific: the system needs to engage in subjec-
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across multiple levels of the hierarchy based on inference about
endogenous control of self-evidencing outcomes. Precision on
action policies on this account is understood to be a fundamen-
tally ‘affective inference’. This gives a novel perspective on how
to conceive of why incoming sensory data should mean some-
thing ‘for me’ as a subject, computationally the meaning being
‘What does this mean for precision on my action model?’. This
confidence estimate in the action model spans multiple levels
of the hierarchy, from the highest levels underpinning the most
invariant expectations of allostatic control across contexts to the
lowest levels tracking moment-to-moment sensorimotor action
selection and correction. This valuation is ‘subjective’ in the sense
that it can be out of step with reality—i.e. the system could be
over-confident or under-confident in these estimations.
As such, the mechanisms underpinning phenomenal con-
sciousness on the current picture—a ‘deep control model’—act to
‘tune’ the organism to adaptive action in the world across mul-
tiple interlocking timescales. On this view, our status as ‘beast
machines’ shapes our subjective experience (Seth and Tsakiris
2018). For instance, it has been demonstrated that neutral stim-
uli are more often perceived as fearful when subjects were given
(false) feedback of increased heart rate (Anderson et al. 2012).
Hierarchically (and temporally) deep contextualization of inte-
roceptive signals tunes an organism to appropriate action and
engagement with environmental affordances (Pezzulo and Cisek
2019) and assigns appropriate weight to priors and ascending pre-
diction errors across the cortical hierarchy. Notice that this means
that even state estimation associated with perceptual inference
is determined by the overarching inference about control of
self-evidencing outcomes—both in terms of the predictive mod-
els encoding sensorimotor relations (‘counterfactual richness’)
grounding the subjective reality of perceptual contents (Seth 2014)
and in terms of those perceptual contents being filtered through
deep goal hierarchies (Pezzulo et al. 2015, 2018).
It is through this inference about allostatic control that a con-
scious agent encounters ‘a structured world apt for action and
intervention, and inflected at every level, by an interoceptively-
mediated sense of mattering, reflecting “how things are for me as
an embodied agent”’ (Clark 2019, 7). The ‘sensorimotor’ and ‘affec-
tive’ dimensions of consciousness on this view are both under-
pinned by a hierarchically deep inference on the fit between the
actual and expected outcomes of actions that informs subsequent
action selection. Even the low-level inference about sensorimotor
control operates within the context of nested goal hierarchies and
as such is understood as inherently affective in virtue of being
enslaved by higher-level goals (Pezzulo et al. 2015). For instance,
failing to execute a motor command correctly involves violating
an expected rate of prediction error reduction. Hierarchically deep
inference means that experience of the world is suffused with our
‘cares and concerns’ (Ramstead et al. 2020b) across multiple lev-
els and accords with the view that visual perceptual experience
is determined by the agent’s ‘poise’ over the ‘action space’, where
we encounter the world as a ‘matrix of possibilities for pursuing
and accomplishing one’s intentional actions, goals and projects’
(Ward et al. 2011, 1).
Interpreting what the current sensory input means ‘for me’—
i.e. for precision on the action model at different levels of the
hierarchy—allows the system to arbitrate between competing
affordances on different timescales. The upshot of this is a com-
mon motivational currency for navigating trade-offs between
affordances competing on different timescales (Pezzulo and Cisek
2019). Conceiving of valence as a ‘common currency’ to arbi-
trate between action plans in this way connects this proposal
to numerous accounts of phenomenal consciousness in the lit-
erature (Cabanac 1992; Morsella 2005; Merker 2007). Moreover,
contextual modulation of the precision on expected free energy is
critically related to flexible behavioural control (Pezzulo et al. 2015)
and as such bridges the current story to the association between
consciousness and flexible behaviour (Dehaene et al. 2017).
The shape of subjectivity: disruptions in
(self-)consciousness
Altered self-experience provides some of the most compelling
illustrations as to how subjectivity is shaped through an inference
about allostatic control. This section briefly considers depersonal-
ization and meditation.
A domain-general loss of precision control has been used to
understand depersonalization disorder (Deane et al. 2020). This
account—through connecting views of affectivity in terms of pre-
cision estimation on expected free energy to the feeling of being
an agent—casts the computationalmechanisms of depersonaliza-
tion as an inferred loss of allostatic control, whereby the system
posits itself as causally inefficacious at realizing self-evidencing
outcomes across contexts. As we saw in the previous section, the
affective systemusually acts to tune the system to action opportu-
nities across multiple interlocking timescales. Depersonalization
is understood as occurring due to a global loss of precision on
action policies and as such the world loses ‘phenomenal depth’—
as described by sufferers of depersonalization—in that it ceases
to solicit engagement and is perceived as flat or two-dimensional
(Medford et al. 2006; Ciaunica et al. 2021). Major depression,
similarly, has been characterized in terms of ‘domain general
inference of a loss of allostatic control’ (Ramstead et al. 2020b).
This phenomenology is contrasted with a perceived gain
in allostatic control in meditation practitioners, as precision
(on prior preferences, for instance) becomes increasingly under
endogenous control (Deane et al. 2020). This account makes use
of the fact that mental action in active inference follows just
the same principles as the account of action initiation put for-
ward earlier, but where the hidden states are ‘attentional’ states
(precisions) and the state transitions are transitions between
attentional states (Smith et al. 2020). The idea here is that ‘focused
attention meditation’ (Lutz et al. 2019) can be understood as the
endogenous withdrawal of precision from prior preferences, due
to the practice of repeatedly bringing attention back to the atten-
tional object, such as the breath. For instance, the sensation of
an itch can be understood in terms of increased precision on a
scratching policy. Through withdrawing precision from the sen-
sation and back to the target sensation (such as the breath) the
system learns an extra level of agentive control, i.e.—endogenous
control of precision on prior preferences. Over time, this becomes
domain general, such that the system learns to have precision
control over its own affective system.
Consciousness in other systems
This section will provide a preliminary sketch of how, through
identifying the neural mechanisms associated with the allostatic
control model, we can assuage the concerns posed by the ‘other
systems’ argument and begin to make inferences about which
kinds of creatures and systems are likely to be conscious sub-
jects. The view put forward in this paper is that inference about
confidence in endogenous self-evidencing capacity, or precision
on expected free energy, underpins phenomenal consciousness.
Inference about control balances physiological and perceptual
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to act adaptively in their environment, enabling both adap-
tive motor control and determining the perceptual salience in
the given context. This section sketches how the complex sen-
sory attenuation mechanisms associated with consciousness on
the present account can give clues as to the neuroanatomi-
cal substrates and processes that are indicative of conscious
experience.
Holst and Mittelstaedt (1950) identified an interpretative prob-
lem as to whether sensory signals arise from the environment
or the animal’s own muscles and movement, dubbed the ‘reaf-
ference problem’. The reafference problem arises due to the fact
that sensory receptors are indifferent to the cause of their activa-
tion, whether it be from exafference—activation stemming from
the environment, or reafference—inputs that result from an ani-
mal’s own movements (Holst and Mittelstaedt 1950). Sensory
neurons are able to respond with high sensitivity to exafferent
inputs despite disruptive self-generated inputs (Bell 1981; Poulet
and Hedwig 2002; Eliades and Wang 2008; Keller and Hahnloser
2009; Ahrens et al. 2012). Across species, the sophisticated fil-
tration process underpinning this high sensitivity to exafferent
inputs is thought to be achieved through the mechanisms of
‘corollary discharge’—predictions of the sensory consequences of
actions that act to suppress reafferent inputs (Crapse and Sommer
2008a). In predictive processing, corollary discharge can be under-
stood simply as top-down predictions that explain away sensory
prediction error (Friston et al. 2010).
Crapse and Sommer (2008a) make a distinction between lower-
order (reflex-inhibition and sensory filtration) and higher-order
(sensory analysis and sensorimotor learning/planning) corollary
discharge based on their underlying neuroanatomical substrates.
Lower-order corollary discharge enables reflex inhibition and sen-
sory filtration, in order to regulate and control sensation entering
the central nervous system, and appear to have the function
of ‘transient, protective inhibition of sensory networks’ (Crapse
and Sommer 2008a, 592). For example, the nematode Caenorhab-
ditis elegans—often used to study simple nervous systems—has
a simple behavioural repertoire and only 302 neurons and uses
lower-order corollary discharge in order to inhibit reflexes that
would be triggered by reafference. Klein and Barron (2016) argue
that in this very simple nervous system—with only two layers
separating sensory neurons from motor neurons—there is no evi-
dence that this sensory attenuation mechanism contributes to a
structured model of the self or a model of action-outcome contin-
gencies informing selection from a range of possible actions. This
is behaviourally as well as neuroanatomically apparent: when
hungry, nematodes respond with increased locomotion in a ran-
dom search pattern (Lüersen et al. 2014; Artyukhin et al. 2015). By
contrast, hungry rodents, ants and bees will direct their search
towards locations where they have encountered food previously
(Oades and Isaacson 1978; Seeley 1995; Wehner 2013). In the
case of the nematode, the corollary discharge does not seem
indicative of a model of temporally deep control, and the lack
of anticipatory and goal-driven behaviour makes it unlikely for
nematodes to have phenomenal consciousness on the present
proposal.
Crapse and Sommer (2008a) identify higher-order corollary dis-
charge as involved in predictive control in perceptual cohesion and
action sequencing—this ‘does’ seem suggestive of a deep control
model. For example, bats explore their environment by emitting
beams of sound and then comparing the emission with the spa-
tiotemporal aspects of the returning echo and to construct a cohe-
sive and counterfactually rich world model. This complex process
involves having predictions about regularities tracking multiple
timescales (Kiebel et al. 2008), and the differences between the
corollary discharge and the input are used to infer properties
such as the size, speed and location of the object reflecting the
sound. In action sequencing, higher-order corollary discharge is
also involved in temporally extended planning strategies—e.g. pri-
mates use corollary discharge to keep an internal record of the
current saccade to facilitate planning the next saccade (Crapse
and Sommer 2008b). Complex reafferent processing is also shown
in juvenile songbirds as they imitate the song of tutor (Brainard
and Doupe 2000; Margoliash 2002). This requires refining ongo-
ing action plans via continuous updating of an internal record
of current state, allowing for flexible contextual interpretation of
sensory input towards the realization of temporally deep goals
(Crapse and Sommer 2008a).
These complex and context-sensitive sensory filtration mech-
anisms may be the most promising hallmarks of consciousness
in non-human animals. Peter Godrey-Smith—in considering the
evolution of subjectivity—reaches a similar conclusion: ‘once ani-
mals start to accommodate and utilize reafference, the character
of sensing changes. The animal is now not only open to the
world, but open to the world as the world, as distinct from self.’
(Godfrey-Smith 2019, 13; Jékely et al. 2021). The current account
may also provide a fuller picture of why ‘unlimited associative
learning’—due to facilitating the complex reafferent processes
associated with a deep self-model—may be a marker of the evolu-
tionary transition tominimal consciousness (Bronfman et al. 2016;
Ginsburg and Jablonka 2019; Birch et al. 2020).
The selflessness challenge
Understanding consciousness in terms of self-consciousness
and self-modelling aligns the current account with many other
approaches across psychology, neuroscience and philosophy that
cast self-consciousness as necessary or constitutive of conscious-
ness itself (Damasio 1999; Metzinger 2003; Gallagher 2010, 2013;
Zahavi 2014; Lou et al. 2017; Millière 2017). For instance, varia-
tions on this claim made in the phenomenological tradition date
back at least to Husserl, and more recently Zahavi (2014) says
that ‘[S]elf-consciousness is an integral and constitutive feature of
phenomenal consciousness […]’ (p. 62). Damasio (1999) argues ‘If
“self-consciousness” is taken tomean “consciousness with a sense
of self,” then all human consciousness is necessarily covered by
the term—there is just no other kind of consciousness as far as I
can see’ (p. 19). All these ‘subjectivity theories’ take on the idea
that consciousness is phenomenologically centred on the self as
the experiencing subject, where consciousness entails a kind of
self-consciousness.
Milliere and Metzinger (2020) argues that subjectivity the-
ories are committed to the ‘necessity claim’—the claim self-
consciousness is necessary for consciousness in general, in con-
trast to the ‘typicality claim’—that self-consciousness is merely
present in ordinary experience. Millière distinguishes six different
notions of self-consciousness that are commonly discussed in the
literature, arguing that there is empirical evidence that there are
states of consciousness where these states fail to be instantiated.
The necessity claim appears to be embedded into the active
inference framework. Friston (2018) states ‘Is self-consciousness
necessary for consciousness? The answer is yes. So, there you
have it—the answer is yes.’ (p. 1). On one hand, the capac-
ity to formalize the deep links between consciousness and self-
consciousness is an explanatory advantage of the active infer-
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understanding a host of closely related phenomena, including
selfhood, emotion, attention and the sense of agency.
On the other hand, commitment to the stronger claim may
present a problem for active inference in delivering a theory of
consciousness. Milliere and Metzinger (2020) highlight the fact
that this view of self-consciousness as embedded into the very
structure of experience may be what Dennett calls Philosopher’s
Syndrome: ‘mistaking a failure of imagination for an insight into
necessity’ (Dennett 1993, 401). Several recent papers have argued
that experiences of altered selfhood present a problem for theo-
ries of consciousness that claim self-consciousness is necessary
for consciousness (Billon and Kriegel 2016; Letheby 2020; Millière
2020). For instance, Billon and Kriegel (2016) take the cases of
‘inserted thoughts’ in schizophrenia, and the disowned mental
states of patients with depersonalization disorder, as problem-
atic cases for proponents of the claim that self-consciousness
is necessary for consciousness—as apparent cases where self-
consciousness appears to be missing from consciousness.
The subjectivity theorist, then, seems to have two options.
The first is to deny that these cases truly present a challenge to
subjectivity theories, in virtue of being only ‘partially selfless’.
Millière notes that none of the partially selfless states of con-
sciousness would be sufficient to rule out a disjunctive version of
the necessity claim—where any form of self-consciousness would
be sufficient but not necessary for consciousness. The second
option is to deny that there really are states of consciousness lack-
ing in self-consciousness. This line of argument appears more
difficult in the face of evidence for states of consciousness that
appear to be ‘totally selfless’—lacking in all the ways one could
be self-conscious. Both Millière (2020) and Letheby (2020) take the
‘totally selfless’ states of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution to
be evidence against the claim that self-consciousness is necessary
for consciousness.
Serotonergic psychedelics such as lysergic acid diethylamide,
psilocybin and N,N-dimethyltryptamine (DMT; found
in ayahuasca) are known to produce profound alterations in
phenomenology (Preller and Vollenweider 2016). Most notably
for present purposes, psychedelic experiences, especially at
high doses, are characterized by profound alterations in self-
consciousness (Huxley 1952; Leary et al. 1964; Lebedev et al.
2015). Both Millière (2020) and Letheby (2020) argue that the
‘total’ ego-dissolution induced by the serotonergic psychedelic 5-
methoxy-DMT (5-MeO-DMT) is the strongest evidence against the
view that self-consciousness is necessary or constitutive of con-
sciousness. While there is empirical evidence that some advanced
forms of meditation practice can also occasion ‘totally’ selfless
states (Millière et al. 2018; Winter et al. 2020; Laukkonen and
Slagter 2021), here I will focus on psychedelics as the most robust
catalysts of selfless states.
Consider these phenomenological reports of the 5-MeO-DMT
experience retrieved from the database of drug experiences
erowid.org, cited in Millière (2020) as evidence of ‘totally selfless’
states:
I was completely disassociated from the ‘real world’ and [from] any
sense of self. It was the most jarring feeling. (#107905)
It is a complete annihilation of self […]. I was absolutely nothing but
a sensory perceiver, stuck within the split seconds that were eternity.
(#18198)
It felt as if all of the atoms of themolecules that typically formmy phys-
ical self simply dispersed, and even my sense of self, or ego, vanished
[…]. (#56384)
I wasn’t me any longer. There was no me. There was no ego. (#27601)
These experiences present considerable counterevidence to
the necessity claim, owing to being both vividly phenome-
nally conscious while totally lacking in any kind of ordinary
self-consciousness. Do these experiences provide genuine evi-
dence against the claim that self-consciousness is necessary
for consciousness? More specifically, are they problematic for
the active inference account of consciousness in terms of self-
consciousness? To address this question, the next section will
provide an account of ego-dissolution in active inference.
Psychedelics and selflessness in active
inference
The REBUS—‘RElaxed Beliefs Under pSychedelics’—model casts
the action of psychedelics in the predictive brain in terms of a
‘relaxation’ (lowering) of the precision of high-level priors, thereby
liberating bottom-up information flow (Carhart-Harris and Friston
2020). Although a preliminary account, the REBUS model is grow-
ing in empirical support (Alamia et al. 2020; Dupuis 2020; Girn et al.
2020; Herzog et al. 2020). The phenomenology of the psychedelic
experience is thought to accord with this description of the under-
lying computational mechanisms. Recall that, in a predictive
coding scheme, if prediction error can be explained away at lower
levels, high-level representations of the model remain stable, as
there is no need to update. Under psychedelics, the relaxation of
high-level priors means that prediction errors that would usually
be explained at lower levels are driven up the predictive hierarchy,
resulting in instability in higher-level representations, whereby
high-level priors no longer constrain lower-level predictions. At
lower doses, this manifests as the phenomenological effects of
psychedelics—e.g. walls may have the appearance of ‘breathing’
(Carhart-Harris and Friston 2019).
This relaxation of high-level priors results in the system adopt-
ing a high Bayesian learning rate on sensory evidence (Mathys
et al. 2014; Hohwy 2017; Deane 2020). A low learning rate means
there is a greater influence of higher-level priors in determining
the resulting posterior, and a high learning rate means there is a
higher precision on sensory evidence and less constraint imposed
by higher-level priors. Appropriately setting the Bayesian learn-
ing rate—the precision on sensory evidence—is crucial for the
system to approximate Bayesian inference over time, as an over-
reliance on prior expectations leads to a failure to learn from
sensory evidence and an overreliance on sensory evidence can
lead the system to ‘overfit’—essentially, find patterns in noise.
The perceptual effects of psychedelics have been characterized
as ‘rampant’ overfitting of sensory evidence (Deane 2020)—where
the system cycles through candidate hypotheses to explain the
influx of highly precise prediction error ascending the cortical
hierarchy.
Another feature of psychedelic phenomenology is that sen-
sory impressions often take on a unique significance often
described as highly aesthetic. Consider Aldous Huxley’s descrip-
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I looked down by chance, andwent on passionately staring by choice, at
my own crossed legs. Those folds in the trousers—what a labyrinth of
endlessly significant complexity! And the texture of the gray flannel—
how rich, how deeply, mysteriously sumptuous! (p. 39)
The books, for example, with which my study walls were lined. Like
the flowers, they glowed, when I looked at them, with brighter colors,
a profounder significance. (p. 24)
On the current account, this quality of significance accompa-
nying the perceptual effects of psychedelics can be understood
as the system inferring high epistemic value due to the high
precision on sensory evidence. This is because ‘the better the pre-
cision on the prediction error, the higher the learning rate; that
is, the more we trust the quality of the evidence the more we
should learn from it’ (Hohwy 2017, 76). Under the view of affec-
tive experiences broadly described earlier as inference about ‘how
well am I self-evidencing?’—the positive emotions in psychedelic
experiences: ‘exhilarated elation with unmotivated laughter, deep
feelings of peace, exuberant joy, and hedonistic pleasure’ (Preller
and Vollenweider 2016, 236)—could put down to the greater
than expected epistemic value associated with the current pol-
icy. This point is relevant for the affective characterization of
ego-dissolution to come.
Psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution
Deane (2020) characterizes psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution
as resulting from a failure of sensory attenuation (see Girn et al.
2020; for recent empirical support for this hypothesis). Recall
that predictions of the sensory consequences of actions (‘corollary
discharges’) allow the system to differentiate between endoge-
nous (self) and exogenous (other) causes of sensation, such that
unexpected sensation is attributed to external causes. Under
a view of phenomenal selfhood as an allostatic control model,
the sense of being an agent arises from inferring oneself to be
an endogenous cause of sensation; i.e. determined by the pre-
dictability of action-outcome contingencies. A number of dis-
ruptions in self-experience have been accounted for in these
terms. For instance, the symptomatology of schizophrenia—such
as thought insertion, where patients report feeling that their
thoughts are not their own—have been understood in terms of
a failure of these sensory attenuation mechanisms (Ford and
Mathalon 2005; Frith 2005; Rösler et al. 2015; Thakkar et al.
2021). Here, the system fails to attribute self-generated out-
comes to endogenous rather than exogenous causes, with the
phenomenological manifestation to the agent being a perceived
loss of agency over their thoughts (Stephens and Graham 1994;
O’Brien and Opie 2003; Gallagher 2004). In the case of voice hear-
ing this can result in attribution of inner speech to an external
source such as another agent (Ford and Mathalon 2005; Ford
et al. 2007).
Corollary discharges—as predictions of the sensory conse-
quences of actions—act to cancel out self-generated sensory out-
comes via sensory attenuation. Unexpected consequences are
then attributed to exogenous rather than endogenous causes.
This means that the more sensory prediction error is generated,
the more likely it is that an action or thought has external as
opposed internal or endogenous causes (Frith 2005; Corlett et al.
2019). Deane (2020) notes that under the REBUS model of the
action of psychedelics, the influx of both exteroceptive and inte-
roceptive prediction error means that the outcomes of actions
(and mental actions) become radically unpredictable. As a result,
the system ceases to posit itself as an endogenous controller of
sensation (and as a causally efficacious agent)—manifesting phe-
nomenologically as ego-dissolution. In the account of thought
insertion above, the thought was attributed to ‘other’ rather than
self, due to not being inferred to be self-generated, based on a
failure of these mechanisms. Ego-dissolution here is being under-
stood in terms of similar mechanisms to the example of thought
insertion described above but is experienced as a more global
dissolution of selfhood due to the influx of unpredictable inputs
from across the cortex, as opposed to being isolated to certain
activity.
Affective tone
While ego-dissolution is described as being devoid of self-
consciousness, it is nonetheless described as a highly conscious
state, characterized by affective extremes. Carhart-Harris and
Friston (2020) distinguish between ‘complete ego-dissolution’—a
state of ‘complete surrender, associated bliss, and union with all
things’ (Carhart-Harris and Friston 2019, 321); and ‘incomplete’
ego-dissolution—a state characterized by intense fear, anxiety
and distress.
‘Complete’ ego-dissolution can be understood on the current
account to be underpinned by two closely related computational
mechanisms. The first relates to pragmatic value and prior prefer-
ences. Recall that, on the account of self-modelling proposed here,
the inference on allostatic control tunes precision on expected
free energy. For instance, this could be a higher precision on a
particular prior preference (consider the example of pain percep-
tion given earlier). Precision on unfulfilled prior preferences can
be a persistent source of suffering to the system—one such exam-
ple being chronic pain, where chronic pain is underpinned by
high precision on a prior preference that is unable to be fulfilled
through action (Hechler et al. 2016). On the view that action arises
from minimizing the discrepancy between the actual (inferred)
current state and the desired state, relaxation of the constrain-
ing influence of high-level priors means they cease to structure
consciousness to engage the organism in their fulfilment, and as
such, end their associated suffering. High-level priors constrain-
ing more domain-general affective states such as mood (Clark
et al. 2018) would also be relaxed under the REBUS model. This
connects closely to the therapeutic potential of the experience:
‘psychedelics work to relax the precision weighting of patholog-
ically overweighted priors underpinning various expressions of
mental illness’ (Carhart-Harris and Friston 2020, 1). Deane (2020)
highlights that the lessened influence of prior preferences accords
with descriptions of the phenomenology of ego-dissolution, for
instance: ‘It felt as if “I” did no longer exist. There was purely my
sensory perception of my environment, but sensory input was not
translated into needs, feelings, or acting by “me”’ (unpublished
online survey data quoted in Millière et al. 2018, 7).
There is another reason ‘complete’ ego-dissolution may be
characteristically ecstatic. Inference about allostatic control is not
just about realizing the pragmatic affordances of action, but also
in maximizing the epistemic value associated with a given policy.
Recall that, in normal functioning, precision on sensory informa-
tion would track the expected epistemic value of sensory inputs.
In the psychedelic state, the relaxation of high-level priors, and
corresponding increase in sensory precision, means the system
infers that the current state is realizing great epistemic value (See
‘Psychedelics and Insight’ in Carhart-Harris and Friston, 2020).
This particular phenomenological quality seems unique to the
serotonergic psychedelics—in a direct comparison between psilo-
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experiences, psilocybin produced ‘greater visual, mystical-type,
insightful, and musical experiences’ (Carbonaro et al. 2018, 1).
Responding to the selflessness challenge
We can now return to the question of whether psychedelic-
induced ego-dissolution threatens active inference theories of
consciousness grounded in self-modelling. To recap the central
position of this paper, subjectivity is underpinned by an inference
about allostatic control—namely an inference on ‘how well am I
self-evidencing’. In other words, subjectivity is underpinned by an
inference evaluating about how well the system is bringing about
(phenotype-specific) expected outcomes, informing policy selec-
tion, and shapes subjectivity determining what is salient to the
organism. This hierarchically deep inference about precision on
the action model is understood to be the computational under-
pinnings of phenomenal selfhood—the sense of being an agent.
Phenomenal selfhood on this view is deep in that it relates to an
inference about the fit between actual and expected outcomes on
multiple hierarchical levels, tracking expected outcomes on prox-
imal and distal timescales. In other words, this evaluation of the
fit between the expectations and outcomes ranges from transient
sensorimotor expectations about the how sensation will unfold
contingent onmotor actions, to the temporally deep (and abstract)
expectations of allostatic control across contexts. These ‘deep’
self-models structure subjectivity in permeating perception of the
world—the ‘meaning’ of sensation is determined bywhat itmeans
‘for me’—i.e. the implications for control of interoceptive states
and allostatic control.
As we have seen, at first glance selfless states such as those
occasioned by psychedelics threaten the necessity relationship
between phenomenal self-modelling and consciousness. How-
ever, equipped with the account of the computational mecha-
nisms underpinning psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution of the
previous section, the inferential process evaluating the fit between
model and world is shown to be intact, as the phenomenology of
ego-dissolution (complete or incomplete) on this account is under-
pinned by a very particular inference about allostatic control that
remains present in the psychedelic state.
The present account puts subjective valuation as the most
basic constitutive feature of a conscious experience—sensation is
always infused with what it ‘means’ for the organism: ‘not every-
thing that happens to us enters our awareness, not by far … but
everything that does is not merely informationally registered but
also felt’ (Kolodny et al. 2021, 2). This fact is brought into sharp
relief in the account of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution, as
affective experience remains even when all the other structuring
features of experience are extinguished. The upshot of this view
is that affective valence can be understood as the most funda-
mental part of conscious experience (Panksepp 1998, 2005, 2008;
Damasio 1999, 2018; Damasio and Carvalho 2013; Man and Dama-
sio 2018). This is a view that dates back at least as far as George
John Romanes:
‘The raison d’être of Consciousness may have been that of
supplying the condition to the feeling of Pleasure and Pain.’
(Romanes 1888, 111)
Grounding consciousness in basic affectivity also has a prece-
dent in the literature on the free energy principle and conscious-
ness, which is particularly consonant with the current picture.
Mark Solms has argued, partially based on evidence of con-
sciousness in decorticated animals and congenitally decorticate
(hydranencephalic) humans, that
‘Consciousness itself is affective. Everything else (from moti-
vation and attention, leading to action and perception, and
thereby to learning)—all of it—is a functional of affect. Affect
obliges the organism to engage with the outside world.’ (Solms
2019, 12)
Moreover, this view seems aligned with a view of ego-
dissolution as only partially selfless states and with the view
proposed here that higher layers of the phenomenal self-model
structure consciousness
‘Affect just is a self-state (and through feeling—i.e., precision
optimisation—it necessarily generates consciousness itself),
which activates (selects) salient perceptual representations,
which eventually include cognitive re-representations of the
self.’ (Solms and Friston 2018, 17)
On this view, feelings in the form of subjectively felt valence
are the most basic constitutive phenomenal states, they pervade
all of experience, guiding the organism to fitness-promoting states
(Inzlicht et al. 2015; Kolodny et al. 2021). While in typical experi-
ence, subjective valuation functions to fine-tune learning (Eldar
et al. 2016) and regulate behaviour, we can see the same mech-
anisms in place in atypical experience such as the psychedelic
state.
It is reasonable to assume that many will not be satisfied with
this characterization of self-consciousness. For instance, on the
definition of self-consciousness as consciousness of oneself ‘as
oneself’ (Smith 2017; Millière 2020), it seems reasonable to con-
clude that psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution is best understood
as being totally selfless, as argued by Millière (2020) and Letheby
(2020). It may be the case that whether ego-dissolution is under-
stood as a state totally devoid of self-consciousness boils down
to how self-consciousness is defined. Millière (2017, 2020) notes
that the disagreements about the necessity claim and the typi-
cality claim may hinge on terminological variation (Guillot 2017),
due to the polysemy of ‘self-consciousness’ and ‘sense of self’.
For present purposes, this is inconsequential. On its more strin-
gent definition, it may be argued that self-consciousness is truly
absent in states of drug-induced ego-dissolution—i.e. if the affec-
tive inference present in these states is deemed not to qualify as
self-consciousness due to not being understood as a representa-
tion of oneself ‘as oneself’. On this definition, the active inference
approach to consciousness put forward in this paper simply does
not qualify as a subjectivity theory and so is not vulnerable to the
selflessness challenge.
It is worth acknowledging there that while psychedelic states
may instantiate affective consciousness in the absence of sen-
sorimotor consciousness, the current account does not rule out
that there can be states of consciousness that vary on these
dimensions. The possibility of states of consciousness, which in
contrast to the psychedelic state, score low on domain-general
affectivity and high on sensorimotor consciousness is consistent
with the current account. Godfrey-Smith (2019) argues that sen-
sorimotor consciousness and evaluative consciousness may be
separable dimensions of consciousness, raising the possibility
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‘If we ask, introspectively, about conspicuous features of
human experience that may have early forms, it might be
intuitive that one side of the phenomenon involves tracking
external objects and events as external – achieving a point of
view on things – while another involves distinctions between
good and bad, a distinction that might be present in phenom-
enal washes that have no definite referral to organism or to
environment.’ (p. 14)
Godfrey-Smith goes on to note that some spiders demon-
strate complex perceptual capacities, but score low in respect
to evidence for complex or varying motivational states. This
would be expected in creatures that, given an evolutionary niche,
do not need a more sophisticated ‘domain general controller’
instantiated by affective inference. Other creatures—such as cer-
tain gastropods—may have richer subjective valuation in the
absence of more complex sensorimotor capacities. On the cur-
rent account, however, both sensorimotor and evaluative aspects
of consciousness are underpinned by a common evaluative infer-
ence about realizing phenotype-congruent outcomes across mul-
tiple timescales. In other words, an inference about how well the
organism is bringing about expected states from low-level and
temporally proximal motor plans to high-level and temporally
distal expectations of self-evidencing outcomes. It is therefore
consistent with the present account that the sensorimotor and
affective aspects of consciousness can vary independently. That
said, on the present account, sensorimotor consciousness is at
least minimally affective owing to being driven by ‘systematic
misrepresentations’ of the system in preferred states of being—
it arises through the system tracking the discrepancy between
actual and preferred states of being.
The active inference approach to consciousness and sub-
jectivity put forward in this paper casts consciousness and
self-consciousness as intimately connected, where phenome-
nal self-models ‘shape’ subjectivity. However, I have aimed to
show that this approach can also accommodate (and illuminate)
phenomenological states largely lacking in self-consciousness.
These ‘selfless states’—understood as ‘(rare) cases in which
normally congruent processes of computational and phenome-
nal self-modelling diverge’ (Limanowski and Friston 2020, 12)—
retain the core aspect of phenomenal self-modelling—subjective
evaluation—even in drastically altered states of consciousness
like ego-dissolution.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that phenomenal consciousness is best
understood within predictive processing in terms of the deep
self-models inherent in the active inference framework. On this
account, subjectivity is structured by a ‘deep control model’—
a hierarchically deep self-model that is tracking the temporally
deep endogenous control of self-evidencing outcomes. Higher
levels provide deep contextualization (interoceptive inference) of
afferent signals from the body (Miller and Clark 2017), tuning the
organism to adaptive opportunities for action. Two objections to
this view have been considered: (i) that the core characteristics
of consciousness in predictive processing is underspecified and
as such cannot inform which systems are conscious, and (ii) the
challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution. I have argued
that neither of these objections is troubling for an active infer-
ence theory of consciousness and as such active inference is a very
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Lebedev AV, LövdénM, Rosenthal G et al. Finding the self by losing the
self: neural correlates of ego-dissolution under psilocybin. Human
Brain Mapping 2015;36:3137–53.
Letheby C. Being for no-one. Philos Mind Sci 2020;1:1–26.
Limanowski J. (Dis-) attending to the body. 2017;1–13.
Limanowski J, Blankenburg F. Minimal self-models and the free
energy principle. Front Hum Neurosci 2013;7:547.
Limanowski J, Friston K. ‘Seeing the dark’: grounding phenome-
nal transparency and opacity in precision estimation for active
inference. Front Psychol 2018;9:643.
Limanowski J, Friston K. Attenuating oneself. Philos Mind Sci
2020;1:1–16.
Lou HC, Changeux JP, Rosenstand A. Towards a cognitive neu-
roscience of self-awareness. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2017;83:
765–73.
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